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Anew basis for the quantitative study 
of ground combat is introduced that 
argues the inadequacy of attrition 
models and the need to incorporate the 
effects of suppression of the enemy with fire- 
power. A quantitative approach to suppres- 
sion of enemy fire is offered. Then an 
analysis shows that the effect of own fire in 
suppressing enemy fire will, in suitable, fre- 
quent circumstances, reverse the conclusions 
derived from the Lanchester square law, so 
that the squared term determining the victor 
is unit firepower instead of the numbers of 
units engaged. 
A fundamental aim of physical science 
is to describe its processes with dynamic 
models, mathematical if possible. The same 
aim, often implicit, is true of descriptions of 
combat phenomena in military operations 
research. Models of military operations are 
necessarily more abstract and approximate 
than those of physical science. This is espe- 
cially so because the scientific study of com- 
bat operations is complicated by human 
presence. The problem, of course, is to 
reduce the enormous effects of "human fac- 
tors," to an understandable construct, or 
paradigm. An excellent statement of the 
problem is in Davis and Blumenthal's mono- 
graph, The Base-of-Sand Problem: A White 
Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling 
[1991]. 
For more than a decade The Military 
Conflict Institute (TMCI) has been address- 
ing the problem via a theory of combat that 
derives from six axioms. A goal of TMCI is 
to express the theory in a study, thus far 
unpublished.1 As something of a status 
report, I undertook a Naval Postgraduate 
School research paper to digest what seemed 
to be the essence of TMCI's work. It is enti- 
tled "Combat Science: An Organizing 
Study" [1993]. The present paper is an expo- 
sition of a small but important consequence 
of the two endeavors. 
We may come at our subject with the 
following question which arises from the 
remarkable results of the Gulf War: 
What analytical proposition helps to 
explain the evidence that much superior 
combat power when properly applied will 
result in disproportionately small losses to 
the winner while he achieves his objective? 
The relevant principles from Combat 
Science are: 
• Military force, or combat power, is a 
real phenomenon, the results of which are 
observed by its effects on the enemy in 
battle. 
• The observable effects of combat 
power are not merely physical (producing 
casualties) but also mental (persuading the 
enemy of our superiority) and spiritual 
(diminishing enemy morale and will to con- 
tinue fighting.) 
For purposes of this paper, we will look 
carefully only at the most measurable mani- 
festation of combat power's mental effect, 
which is suppression of enemy actions, 
specifically his return of fire. Its spiritual 
effect to diminish enemy morale plays no 
part in the computations that follow, but 
may be seen to be an unquantified bonus. 
Let us begin with a fresh look at the 
Lanchester square law from the perspective 
of combat science. As it was conceived and 
employed by Chase [1902], Fiske [1905], 
Osipov [1915] and Lanchester [1915] the 
square law describes combat as a purely 
physical phenomenon: 
[Unit fire's physical effect in casualties 
imposed/minute] 
[# of physical units firing] 
[Fewer enemy units] 
Starting with Osipov, who reached his 
own unique conclusion as to the appropriate 
relationships, there have been many objec- 
tions that the classical square law does not 
fit the historical battle casualty data for 
ground combat. The most commonly cited 
reason is (properly enough) that the law can- 
not apply when the required conditions are 
not present in the battle. The conditions are 
that each participant must be able to fire at 
each participant on the opposing side; and 
incapacitated opponents must be known at 
once, so that fire is distributed only against 
active opponents. Patently these conditions 
are seldom fully met, with not-so-obvious 
effects on the square law's applicability. 
There are probably three additional 
major reasons, each related to the other two. 
One is insufficient attention to defender 
advantage. Unit fire effectiveness will nor- 
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the attack is nearly consumated. This advantage 
comes from the defender's superior posture. 
When identical unit effectiveness is (wrongly) 
assumed for attacker and defender the results 
will appear to show a less-than-square-law effect 
for the attacker's numerical advantage. 
The second reason is that a battle is usually 
episodic, such that different elements of a force 
play predominant roles at different phases of the 
battle. A battle might involve disproportionate 
losses upon the attacker during his assault and 
disproportionate losses upon the defender dur- 
ing his attempt to disengage. Different weapons 
produce casualties more and less effectively 
during different phases. Historical battle data 
rarely specify casualty production in this way 
and so the episodic effects are disregarded out of 
necessity. 
The third reason is shortage of data with 
which to measure the effect of suppression of 
enemy actions from firepower.2 Since suppres- 
sion produces no casualties and is a transitory 
phenomenon that disappears when the battle is 
over, the effect of its presence is overlooked (or is 
merely implicit) in almost all combat models, 
including high resolution simulations. In 
Chapter 18 of Understanding War, T. Dupuy 
began his fine discussion of suppression with: 
"There is probably no obscurity of combat 
requiring clarification and understanding more 
urgently than that of suppression" [1987]. 
The heart of the problem is not a refusal to 
acknowledge the importance of suppression but 
the lack of an analytical approach that describes 
the phenomenon and its importance. We wish 
here to develop a quantifiable model of it. Then 
we will fulfill the purpose of this paper, which is 
to show how an appreciation of the cognitive 
influence of fire can reverse present conceptions 
of the value of numbers relative to the unit fire- 
power of a fighting force. 
We begin with the common form of the 
Lanchester square law: 
dA dB 
dt -ßB(t) dt a A{t)    (1) 
where a and ß are the constant unit effectiveness 
coefficients for A and B respectively, measured in 
kills per shooter per unit of time. A(0) and B(0) 
are the initial force strength; A(t) and B(t) are the 
forces remaining at any later time t; and dA/dt 
and dB/dt are the rate of losses of A and B 
respectively at time t. 
A solution to equations [1] for end time T is 
the state equation: 
a [A(0)2 - A(T)2] = ß [B(0V - B(T)2] (2) 
Equation [2] shows the well known square 
law phenomenon, in which A will win a fight 
when the weaker side is annihilated: 
aA(0)2>ßB(0)2 
and vice-versa. The classic conclusion from the 
square law is that the "fighting strength" 
(Lanchester's term) of a force increases in direct 
proportion to unit effectiveness and in propor- 
tion to the square of the number of forces 
engaged. 
Notably, the casualty-producing effect of fire 
is regarded as a constant. There is ample evi- 
dence that unit effectiveness, a or ß, is not even 
approximately constant but is highly variable. 
This is true when one is using casualty data 
taken battle after battle or day after day during a 
campaign: see for example, D. Hartley [1990, pp. 
3-4; and 1991, p. 3]. It is true when one is using 
casualty data taken from different places on a 
battlefield: see G. Kuhn [1989], for example. It is 
true during different phases of a battle: see 
R. Helmbold [1979], for example.3 Even though 
data by phase is seldom available, the variability 
of fire effectiveness is readily appreciated by 
reflecting upon a battle's sequence: for example, 
an artillery preparation phase, an armored 
assault phase, and an exploitation phase after an 
enemy position is overrun. 
If a (t) and ß (t) are also variables, then the 
Lanchester square law equations must be writ- 
ten: 
dA 
dt = -ß(t)B(t) 
dB 
dt = -a(t)A(t) (3) 
Two important reasons that a (t) and ß (t) 
vary are: first, a change in range between the 
fighting units as the battle unfolds; and second, 
the suppressive effect of each side's fire on the 
other's fire. For two forces fixed in place with no 
change in range, the suppression suffered by A 
will be in consequence of the volume and 
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accuracy of fire by B, and vice versa. Let us pos- 
tulate a constant of proportionality, g, such that 
g/3(t)B(t) is the time-rate at which each A-shoot- 
er's fire is curtailed (measured in volume or 
accuracy or both). Similarly define a value, h, 
such that ha(t)A(t) is the rate that each B-shoot- 
er's effectiveness is diminished by A's fire.4 We 
write: 
da dß ■ha(t)A(t)      (4) 
The total effect of firepower represented by 
equations [3] and [4] is twofold. Fire will reduce 
both the numbers of enemy forces remaining 
and the lethal effectiveness of the remaining 
forces. Old equations [3] and new equations [4], 
however, have dimensions incompatible with 
each other. After reconciling the dimensions (to 
killing power lost per unit of time), it is possible 
to retain all quantities and proceed to explore the 
relationships between the four equations. There 
remains, of course, the serious problem of find- 
ing data, even rough data, for inputs. 
DEVELOPMENT 
Let us proceed, now, to develop our princi- 
pal point. As remarked above, casualties are a 
permanent consequence of fire, but suppres- 
sion's effect is only transitory. We usually say 
combat forces are "pinned down" under fire, but 
not permanently affected. Arguably the changes 
in a and ß will be much greater during a battle 
than the changes in force size caused by attrition. 
In a typical land battle, casualties will be less 
than 10%.5 See among many examples, R. 
McQuie, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates as a 
Measure of Defeat" [1987]. 
As McQuie says, something other than casu- 
alties must cause the losing side to break off 
action in a typical battle. In many, perhaps most, 
battles mission success is obtained by the cumu- 
lative cognitive effects of fire on the enemy. The 
losing side's forces curtail their maneuvers and 
fire to avoid destruction. The losing side is also 
increasingly dispirited, with further loss of fight- 
ing effectiveness. Or the losing commander 
thinks that the situation can only go from bad to 
worse and withdraws to fight afresh from what 
he hopes will be a more favorable posture. 
We may easily explore circumstances in 
which the volume and precision of fire have a 
much greater effect to suppress enemy fire than 
to impose casualties. Define b(t) as the rate of fire 
in shots by each unit B, and a(t) as the rate of fire 
by each A. Define s as the rate of reduction of fire 





-ä = -sAa(t) (5) 
With equations [5] we measure combat 
power wholly by its effect on the volume and 
accuracy of the enemy's return fire during the 
course of the battle. The model, in its stylized 
purity, says that a battle is won by the side that 
sustains its own fire and suppresses that of the 
enemy. Casualties are an unmeasured by- 
product. 
The state equation for [5] is entirely analo- 
gous to equation [2]: 
A[a(0)2 - a(T)2] = B[b(0)2 - b(T)2] (6) 
Equation [6] leads to a radically new "law" 
of combat in which the quantity of fire (mea- 
sured by its suppressive effect) is the squared 
term. Now side A will win a battle in which the 
enemy's capacity to fire back is "annihilated" 
(fully suppressed) if: 
Aa(0)2>Bb(0)2 
When the cognitive effects (on mind and 
will to win) predominate over casualties inflicted 
because the accuracy and intensity of fire cause 
the enemy's accuracy and intensity to deterio- 
rate, under those circumstances effective unit 
firepower is more valuable than numbers en- 
gaged. The losing side will discontinue the battle 
because it is being dominated by the enemy's fire, 
will over time be reduced to impotence, and will 
eventually be destroyed if it does not concede 
the enemy's military objective. Under such cir- 
cumstances the traditional Lanchester square 
law conclusion favoring numbers over quality is 
reversed, and unit firepower is more influential 
than numbers of units. 
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A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
As a numerical example, let A(0) = 10 units 
of force, and B(0) = 5 units. Let the initial 
destruction rate of A be a (0) = 1 kill of B per A 
unit per hour; and of B, ß (0) = 2 kills of A per B 
unit per hour. The two sides are equal at the out- 
set in the sense that 
a A = ß B = 10 kills per hour. 
If the Lanchester square law applies, unit 
fire is constant and continuous, with a = 1 and 
ß = 2, and equation [2] obtains. 
• A will win a fight to the finish, and when 
the B force is destroyed, A(T) = 7.07 units, so 71% 
of the A force survives. Such is the power of 
numbers under Lanchester square law condi- 
tions. 
• If B senses defeat after one of its 5 units 
(20%) is lost and successfully ends the battle, 
A(T) = 9.05 when it is over. A has lost nearly one 
unit to B's superior fire, which is almost as much 
as B lost. A's long term cumulative advantage of 
numbers has not had time to take effect. 
Next assume that the effect of suppression 
on enemy fire works much faster and is far more 
important than attrition. Equation [6] applies, so 
that in a formal sense neither side loses units. 
A = 10 and B = 5 are constants, and only the vol- 
ume and accuracy of each side's fire is affected 
by the other's. Let the initial firing rate of A be 
a(0) = 10 rounds per minute per shoooter and let 
each round suppress enemy fire at s = .01 rounds 
per minute per enemy unit. Correspondingly, let 
b(0) = 20 rounds per minute with the same value 
of s. The two sides' initial volumes of fire are 
equal in that Aa(0) = Bb(0) = 100 rounds per 
minute. 
• At time T when B has totally suppressed 
A's fire, each unit of B has an unsuppressed rate 
of fire remaining of b(T) = 1.414 rounds per 
minute, or 71% of the initial rate. We may pre- 
sume A to be impotent and at the mercy of B. 
• If A senses that B's volume of fire is domi- 
nant after his fire has been curtailed by 20%, he 
may end the battle and withdraw as he is able. 
At the time the battle is over, a(T) = 8 rounds per 
minute per shooter, and b(T) = 18.1 at its end, 
which is 90.5% of B's initial firepower. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SUPPRESSION MODEL 
An interpretation of the suppression compu- 
tation is interesting in several regards. 
First, by supposition B inflicts no casualties, 
and so all of A may withdraw and live to fight 
another day. It is possible that A's force is perma- 
nently disorganized and demoralized, but that is 
not inherent in the model. 
Second, the battle is won by superior unit 
firepower, even though at its outset the total rate 
of fire and fire effectiveness of both sides were 
equal; unit effectiveness is more influential than 
the number of units. 
Third, B wins by forcing A to concede B's 
tactical objective or else suffer complete suppres- 
sion and, by presumption, destruction. Mission 
accomplishment is a good way to decide who 
won the battle, but it is not the usual way in 
analysis, which is to compare casualties. Prob- 
ably B's organization and morale will be 
stronger after the battle than before it, but again, 
the model does not tell us. 
Fourth, we should not conclude that A's sit- 
uation is hopeless in future battles. Now that we 
know the significance of treating a and b (or a 
and ß) as time-dependent variables, we may 
anticipate battlefield conditions in which A finds 
a stronger position with an improved firepower 
ratio and so is able to exploit its numerical 
advantage. 
Fifth, observe that the victory went to the 
side whose fire dominated on the battlefield. In a 
formal sense this was true by postulation, for we 
assumed that attrition played no part. Never- 
theless it is useful to look at how and why the 
lethal potential of B's superior fire was decisive. 
It was in part because B's fire attenuated A's fire 
more rapidly, and in part because after A is 
reduced to impotence he must surrender or face 
destruction. In war the activation and effective 
employment of superior firepower is the central 
cause of victory, whether or not casualties deter- 
mine the outcome. (Our model ignores move- 
ment for the sake of analytical simplicity, but it is 
safe to say battlefield movement unsupported by 
covering, suppressive fire is a rare occurrence. 
Tactical maneuvering is achieved by an astute 
blend of covering fire and movement.) 
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Sixth, these models are formalisms, whether 
basic equations [1], [3] or [5] are used. For one 
thing, casualties will occur on both sides. For 
another, the reduction of fire on the losing side 
caused by the winner's fire will usually not go 
all the way to zero. There is a point of diminish- 
ing returns in the suppression effect of fire 
towards attenuating enemy fire. 
Seventh, as a reminder, ground combat is 
our subject. Naval and air combat take their own 
form. In the judgment of the author, attrition is 
the essential phenomenon, and suppression as a 
driving cause of sea and air battle outcomes is 
rare. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Let us summarize the major points of the 
quantitative analysis: 
• The coefficients of unit effectiveness 
ought to be regarded as variables in time. 
• Fire volume and unit effectiveness will 
often be far more variable than the change due to 
casualties, in which case they have a greater 
immediate effect on the outcome than attrition. 
• When unit firepower is diminished more 
rapidly than the surviving number of units (due 
to the effectiveness of enemy fire) then the unit 
firepower advantage has the square law effect, 
not numerical advantage. 
It is quite reasonable to expect that the sup- 
pression effect of superior combat power will 
frequently be greater than the attrition effect. 
Referring again to McQuie, at the end of 80 bat- 
tles in and after World War II, the median casual- 
ties were 4% at the time the attacker abandoned 
his objective and 8% when the defender con- 
ceded defeat. McQuie cites the decisive effect of 
maneuver (or by implication the inability to 
maneuver) as the salient reason for termination 
by the loser in the majority of the battles. We 
have not examined the suppression of maneu- 
ver, though it is possible to do so. In any case, 
McQuie's data suggest that casualties are seldom 
the determinant of battle outcome. They also 
suggest that when the attacker's success results 
in a rout or surrender of the enemy, casualties 
may be principally in the form of prisoners taken 
instead of bodies slain. 
One should not go so far as to disregard 
attrition. But even if one regards casualties as the 
available and hence utilitarian measure, never- 
theless the Lanchester square law does not fol- 
low with its conclusion that numerical ad- 
vantage is more valuable than unit firepower. 
Indeed, in recent research to demonstrate the 
utility of his "defender's advantage parameter," 
R. Helmbold [1995] shows that numerical advan- 
tage, which is the most important determinant in 
the square law, is among the worst predictors of 
victory in 83 historical battles. One should 
regard attrition and suppression both as impor- 
tant. This analysis suggests, to say the least, that 
their source—firepower—is more influential that 
numbers engaged. 
But the answer we offer here to the question 
posed in the beginning is that sharply superior 
combat power must impose and exploit suppres- 
sion when the goal is a relatively bloodless victo- 
ry. The best example in the past 50 years of 
victory by suppression is the German blitzkrieg 
of 1940 in France. The blitzkrieg had many of the 
properties of the Gulf War. No attrition model 
can explain the blitzkrieg phenomenon, which 
was achieved by an intensive, local suppression 
of the defenders' ability to resist during a 
German armored-mechanized breakthrough. 
The breakthrough was followed by extensive 
demoralization of the French defenders when 
they faced an enemy in their rear. Blitzkrieg 
(a.k.a. lightning war or maneuver warfare) 
worked on the minds and spirits of the enemy to 
reduce his combat power to near zero. 
It is in the nature of a successful campaign of 
maneuver that few battles are fought and the 
casualties that attract the interest of military his- 
torians and analysts are largely absent. To under- 
stand the full value of very superior combat 
power one must look for Sherlock Holmes' dog 
that didn't bark: mission attainment with the 
near-absence of combat and casualties. Perusal 
of battles analyzed quantitatively reveal few if 
any for the entire 1940 German campaign in 
France. For example, Combat History Analysis 
Study Effort: CHASE, by R. Helmbold [1986] lists 
only one, Sedan-Meuse River of 13 May 1940. 
Another example is the Japanese defeat of the 
British on the Malay Peninsula in 1941 in a bril- 
liant campaign of maneuver with never a battle 
worthy of the history books. These are examples 
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of what Sun Tzu told us long ago is the true 
measure of successful generalship [1963, p. 77]. 
We recall what Clausewitz said in the same vein: 
it is not the attacker but the defender who initi- 
ates a battle; the defender may choose to con- 
cede the opponent his aim instead of fighting 
[1976, p. 377]. 
One may well ask why American military 
tacticians should not long ago have perceived 
the quite reasonable, if not obvious, relationships 
described above. It is probably a proclivity to 
leap at once to the "practical:" an ad hoc per- 
spective and disinterest in general theory Since 
1950 the practical problem under study has been 
"how to fight outnumbered and win," tied to the 
NATO central front in Europe. The advantage of 
superior firepower, its potential for reducing 
casualties, and the deeper effects of the phenom- 
ena of combat power were not ours to exploit 
until the Gulf War. 
The best military leaders have always 
sought victory by domination and control, not 
bloodshed. We analysts do a disservice if our 
studies cannot carry the quantitative analysis of 
battle outcomes beyond the measurement of 
casualties. The U. S. government seems to be in 
the process of casting aside the means to apply 
overwhelming combat power in the next major 
regional conflict. It would be most timely to give 
some attention to suppression as a root cause 
and dominance as the vital effect in determining 
the highly favorable outcome of the ground cam- 
paign in the Gulf War, and many others. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Army and Marine Corps espouse 
"maneuver warfare." The thoughtful reader will 
see the possibility of extending the model herein 
in a number of ways that lead to a better under- 
standing of maneuver's advantage, and the rela- 
tionship between fire and movement. 
a. The first and simplest is to work out the 
mathematics when both attrition and suppres- 
sion result from fire; in other words, when fire 
reduces enemy numbers and return fire simulta- 
neously. Some parametric analysis of the rela- 
tionships will then be possible, but eventually 
the more difficult task of obtaining numerical 
values will have to be confronted. Clues to 
maneuver warfare are involved because one 
effect of suppressive fire is to "pin down" the 
enemy with one element of force (notably 
artillery and close air support), while another 
achieves a penetration (notably armor), or 
maneuvers on a flank (notably mechanized or 
other mobile forces). 
b. The Lanchester square law form has been 
the basis of this discourse. There is no reason to 
think the square law is "right," except that 
aimed fire is the image of the hypothetical en- 
gagements described. I have been somewhat 
vague about the extent to which suppressive fire 
is aimed or fire-hosed. What we do know from 
Osipov, Helmbold, Hartley and others is that the 
square law advantage of numbers has rarely 
been achieved when measured by attrition. I 
think operations analysts of ground combat 
should wish to investigate whether historical 
results comport with combat models better after 
suppression is introduced. I do not know 
whether to suggest starting with the square law, 
the linear law, or something in between. Their 
instincts will be better than mine. 
c. For the purpose of modeling maneuver 
warfare, a more direct approach is to extend the 
equations to include the suppression of move- 
ment as well as fire. On one hand, this is appeal- 
ing because we know that fire inhibits enemy 
movement, yet combat models do not reflect it 
as a function of the accuracy and volume of 
enemy fire. On the other hand, one discovers a 
dimensionality problem and must wrestle with 
inputs in terms of the deceleration rate, which 
has units of meters/minute-enemy shot or the 
equivalent. If we analysts are serious about help- 
ing to explore the operations and tactics of 
maneuver warfare, it seems incumbent on us to 
try, by showing the connection between move- 
ment and supporting (suppressing) fire in 
maneuver warfare. For what it is worth, it is cer- 
tainly possible to write equations in which fire 
has all three effects: casualties, suppression of 
fire, and suppression of movement. 
d. Another approach would be to regard 
the effect of opening fire as a step function. In 
such a model, the instant fire is opened, enemy 
return fire (or motion) is diminished to a new, 
lower level. This is more or less implicit now in 
the inputs for the coefficients of unit effective- 
ness. The new feature would be to scale the 
Page 32 Military Operations Research, Fall 1995 
TWO EFFECTS OF FIREPOWER 
effectiveness of B's fire (or motion) inversely 
with the accuracy and intensity of A's fire. To my 
knowledge, this has never been attempted. The 
conceptualization is not a big step, but the scal- 
ing factors would come only with great difficulty. 
ENDNOTES 
1. To TMCI it seemed desirable to call their 
cornerstones Axioms, whether traced from an 
innate comprehension of truth or derived from 
common experience. The six axioms are thought 
to be the fewest possible, so obvious as to be 
indisputable, and so essential that no structure of 
theory or model should proceed without cog- 
nizance of them. Root definitions must, of 
course, accompany them: 
Definition 1. A MILITARY FORCE is a set of 
elements which are activated for combat. 
AXIOM 1. COMBAT occurs by deadly 
interactions between military forces. 
Definition 2. COMMAND is the function 
which organizes, motivates, makes decisions 
regarding, and directs the activities of its force. 
AXIOM 2. In combat each COMMAND 
seeks to achieve a goal, called its mission, 
which has perceived value. 
Definition 3. COMBAT POTENTIAL is the 
latent capacity of a military force to achieve 
results in combat. 
AXIOM 3. COMBAT POTENTIAL is 
embodied in military forces. 
Definition 4. COMBAT POWER is the real- 
ized capability of a military force at an instant of 
time to achieve results in combat. 
AXIOM 4. Command activates its combat 
potential to create COMBAT POWER in fur- 
therance of a mission. 
Definition 5. DOMINATION is the condition 
wherein one military force imposes its will on 
the other. 
AXIOM 5. In combat, DOMINATION of 
the opposing military force is the ultimate 
means of achieving an objective. 
AXIOM 6. UNCERTAINTY is inherent in 
combat. 
The status of TMCI theory of combat may be 
had from the author at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California 93943, or Dr. 
Donald S. Marshall, Executive Director of The 
Military Conflict Institute, 12 Fairfield Street, 
Salem, Massachusetts 01970. 
2. A source of some rare exceptions is 
MORS' two-volume Proceedings of the Second 
Mini-Symposium on the topic, Human Behavior 
and Performance as Essential Ingredients in Realistic 
Modeling of Combat—MORIMOC II. Among the 
noteworthy papers are: 
a. David Rowland, "Assessment of Combat 
Performance with Small Arms" 
b. Charles L. Frame, Brian R. McEnany and 
Kurt A. Kadivko, "Combat Operational Data 
Analysis: An Examination World War II 
Suppression Data" 
c. George Schecter, James C. Richards and 
Henry A. Romberg, "Tactical Deterrent Effects 
Model" 
d. Trevor N. Dupuy, "The Fundamental 
Information Base For Modeling Human 
Behavior In Combat" 
3. On page 2 of this early paper by one of 
our most prolific and perceptive analysts of his- 
torical ground combat, Helmbold writes: 
"[Daniel] Willard's approach is typical of those 
which attempt to infer the form of Lanchester's 
equations from an analysis of a large number of 
battles for which the initial and final strengths on 
both sides are known, without depending on 
any information about the details of their attri- 
tion histories. A finding that this approach is 
fully justified would be of capital importance for 
the development of a theory of combat, because 
data on initial and final strengths are available 
for hundreds of battles. . .they at least are much 
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more readily available than data on attrition his- 
tories" [1979]. In the preceding paragraph 
Helmbold has just finished taking note of the 
famous effort by J. Engel to validate the Lan- 
chester square law's shape as it unfolded during 
the extended Battle of Iwo Jima, so he is clearly 
concerned with the attrition history occuring 
within a battle, or short campaign. 
4. A more thorough description would back- 
track to equations [3] to explain that functions a 
and ß are really composites of a firing rate term 
in shots fired/minute, and an accuracy term, in 
hits per shot. Then in equations [4] we would 
have same firing rate value as in equations [3] 
plus a suppression term, in shots surpressed per 
shot fired. 
5. In memorable and decisive battles, casual- 
ties have been as much as 25-35%, but such bat- 
tles are usually episodic, comprising separate 
phases in which large changes of a and ß in 
effect define the phases. 
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